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Abstract:  We show the negative relation between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, 
that is, the Phillips curve using an overlapping generations model under monopolistic competition. 
We consider the effects of exogeneous changes in labor productivity. An increase (decrease) in the 
labor productivity in a period induces a decrease (increase) in the employment, an increase 
(decrease) in the unemployment rate and a falling (rising) in the price of the goods in the same 
period. Then, given the price in the previous period the inflation rate falls (rises). This conclusion is 
based on the premise of utility maximization of consumers and profit maximization of firms. 
Therefore, we have presented a microeconomic foundation of the Phillips curve. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012) presented a microeconomic foundation of the negative relation 
between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, that is, the Phillips Curve (Phillips (1958)) 
using an overlapping generations model (OLG model) under monopolistic competition. They have 
shown that, the lower the unemployment rate in a period (for example period 𝑡𝑡 − 1), the higher the 
inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Their logic is as follows. They assume that the low (or 
high) unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 raises (or lowers) the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡 by 
learning effect. If the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 increases, the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡 falls. Then, by the behavior of firms in monopolistic competiton the price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 
rises given nominal wage rate, and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 falls given the 
(expected) price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Alternatively, a decrease in the unemployment rate in 
period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 raises the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡. Then, the price of the goods falls, and the 
infaltion rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 rises given the (expected) price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. However, we do not find their conclusion that the low unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 
explains the high inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 to be satisfactory. A fall in the price in 
period 𝑡𝑡 means that the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to period 𝑡𝑡 falls, that is, the low 
unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 explains the low (not high) inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to 
period 𝑡𝑡. 
 Instead, in this paper we consider the effects of exogenous changes in labor productivity. It may 
be due to a change in the unemployment rate in the previous period as assumed by Otaki and 
Tamai (2011, 2012). We will show the negative ralationship between the unemployment rate and 
the inflation rate in the same period. Our logic is as follows. If the labor productivity in a period, for 
example, period 𝑡𝑡 increases, the employment decreases and the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 
increases. Then, by the behavior of firms in monopolistic competiton the price of the goods falls 
given nominal wage rate, and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to period 𝑡𝑡 decreases. 
Alternatively, if the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡 decreases, the employment increases and the 
unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 decreases. Then, the price of the goods rises given nominal wage 
rate, and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to period 𝑡𝑡 increases. 
  Some other references about Phillips curve are Lucas (1972), Calvo (1983), Mankiw and Reis 
(2002) and Woodford (1996). According to Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012), every work on the Phillips 
curve presumes some market imperfection, and it implies that if there does not exist some price 
stickiness assumption or imperfect information, the negative correlation between inflation and un- 
employment will disappear. This paper will show that it isn't. 
 In Section 2 we analyze behaviors of consumers and firms. In Section 3 we consider the equiuribrium 
of the economy with involuntary unemployment. In Section 4 we show the main results about the 
negative relation between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. 
 
2.  Behaviors of consumers and firms 
 
 We consider a two-periods (young and old) OLG model under monopolistic competition according 
to Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011, 2015 and 2016). There is one factor of production, labor, and there is a 
continuum of goods indexed by 𝑧𝑧 ∈ [0,1]. Each good is monopolistically produced by Firm 𝑧𝑧. 
Consumers are born at continuous density [0,1] × [0,1] in each period. They can supply only one 
unit of labor when they are young (period 1). 
  In the case of the two-period overlapping generations model, the fall in nominal wage rates and 
prices may increase the real value of the old generation's savings and increase consumption, but if 
we consider the three-period overlapping generations model that includes childhood period, we can 
show that the fall in nominal wage rates and prices may instead reduce consumption. See Tanaka 
(2020) for details. That point is irrelevant to the purpose of this paper. 
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2.1  Consumers 
 
 We use the following notations.  
  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧𝑧 in period 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧): price of good 𝑧𝑧 in period 𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖: consumption basket in period  𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = ��10 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−1𝜂𝜂 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, 𝜂𝜂 > 1. 
 𝛽𝛽: disutility of labor, 𝛽𝛽 > 0.  𝑊𝑊: nominal wage rate. Π: profits of firms which are equally distributed to each consumer. 𝐿𝐿: employment of each firm and the total employment. 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓: population of labor or employment in the full-employment state. 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿): labor productivity. 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) ≥ 1. 
  
 𝛿𝛿 is the definition function. If a consumer is employed, 𝛿𝛿 = 1; if he is not employed, 𝛿𝛿 = 0. The 
labor productivity is 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿). We assume increasing or constant returns to scale technology. Thus, 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)is increasing or constant with respect to the employment of a firm 𝐿𝐿. We define the employment 
elasticity of the labor productivity as follows.  𝜁𝜁 = 𝑦𝑦′𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)𝐿𝐿 . 
We assume 0 ≤ 𝜁𝜁 < 1. Increasing returns to scale means 𝜁𝜁 > 0. 𝜂𝜂 is (the inverse of) the degree of 
differentiation of the goods. In the limit when 𝜂𝜂 → +∞, the goods are homogeneous. We assume  �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� (1 + 𝜁𝜁) < 1 
so that the profits of firms are positive. 
 The utility of consumers of one generation over two periods is  𝑈𝑈(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2,𝛿𝛿,𝛽𝛽) = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽. 
We assume that 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) is homogeneous of degree one (linearly homogeneous). The budget 
constraint is  �10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + �10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π. 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧) is the expectation of the price of good 𝑧𝑧 in period 2. The Lagrange function is  ℒ = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽 − 𝜆𝜆 ��10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + �10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 − 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 − Π�. 𝜆𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions are  
                   
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 1𝜂𝜂1−1𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧),                         (1) 
and  
                    
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 �∫10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 1𝜂𝜂1−1𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧).                (2) 
They are rewritten as  
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1 �∫10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧), (3) 
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𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2 �∫10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧). (4) 
Let  
 𝑃𝑃1 = �∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂 , 𝑃𝑃2 = �∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂. 
They are prices of the consumption baskets in period 1 and period 2. By some calculations we obtain 
(please see Appendix)  
 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) = 𝜆𝜆 �∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + ∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = 𝜆𝜆(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π), (5) 
  
 
𝑃𝑃2𝑃𝑃1 = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 , (6) 
  
 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π. (7) 
The indirect utility of consumers is written as follows  
 𝑉𝑉 = 1𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) (𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π) − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽. (8) 𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) is a function which is homogeneous of degree one. The reservation nominal wage rate 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 
is a solution of the following equation.  
1𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) (𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 + Π) − 𝛽𝛽 = 1𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2)Π. 
From this  𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2)𝛽𝛽. 
The labor supply is indivisible. If 𝑊𝑊 > 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅, the total labor supply is 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓. If 𝑊𝑊 < 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅, it is zero. If 𝑊𝑊 =𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅, employment and unemployment are indifferent for consumers, and there exists no involuntary 
unemployment even if 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓. 
 Indivisibility of labor supply may be due to the fact that there exists minimum standard of living even 
in the advanced economy (please see Otaki (2015)). 
 Let 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑃𝑃2𝑃𝑃1. This is the expected inflation rate (plus one). Since 𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) is homogeneous of degree 
one, the reservation real wage rate is  𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 = 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃1 = 𝜑𝜑(1,𝜌𝜌)𝛽𝛽. 
If the value of 𝜌𝜌 is given, 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 is constant. 
 Otaki (2007) assumes that the wage rate is equal to the reservation wage rate in the equilibrium. 
However, there exists no mechanism to equalize them. We assume that 𝛽𝛽 and 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 are not so large. 
 
2.2  Firms 
 
 Let  𝛼𝛼 = 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = 𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝜌𝜌𝑋𝑋2 , 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1. 
From (3) ∼ (7),  𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π)��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Since  𝑋𝑋1 = 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π)𝑃𝑃1 , 
we have  
(𝑋𝑋1)1𝜂𝜂−1 = ��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 = �𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π)𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂−1. 
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Therefore,  𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π) �𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π)𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = �𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π)𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂 𝑃𝑃1𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Thus,  𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1𝜂𝜂 = �𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π)𝑃𝑃1 �1𝜂𝜂 𝑃𝑃1(𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧))−1. 
Hence,  𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π)𝑃𝑃1 �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃1 �−𝜂𝜂 . 
This is demand for good 𝑧𝑧 of an individual of younger generation. Similarly, his demand for good 𝑧𝑧 
in period 2 is  𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧) = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π)𝑃𝑃2 �𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃2 �−𝜂𝜂 . 
Let 𝑀𝑀 be the total savings of consumers of the older generation carried over from their period 1. It is 
written as  𝑀𝑀 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(𝑊𝑊�𝐿𝐿� + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Π�). 𝑊𝑊� , 𝐿𝐿� and Π� are the nominal wage rate, the employment and the profit in the previous period. Then, 
their demand for good 𝑧𝑧 is  𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃1 �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃1 �−𝜂𝜂 . 
The government expenditure constitutes the national income as well as consumptions of younger and 
older generations. The total demand for good 𝑧𝑧 is written as  
 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃1 �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑃𝑃1 �−𝜂𝜂. 𝑌𝑌 is the effective demand defined by  
 𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Π) + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀. 𝐺𝐺 is the government expenditure (about this demand function please see Otaki (2007), (2009)). The 
total employment, the total profits and the total government expenditure are  �10 𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝐿𝐿, �10 Π𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = Π, �10 𝐺𝐺𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝐺𝐺. 
We have  𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = −𝜂𝜂 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃1 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)−1−𝜂𝜂(𝑃𝑃1)−𝜂𝜂 = −𝜂𝜂 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
From 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿),  𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 1𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′ 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
The profit of Firm 𝑧𝑧 is  𝜋𝜋(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) − 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧). 𝑃𝑃1 is given for Firm 𝑧𝑧. Note that the employment elasticity of the labor productivity is  𝜁𝜁 = 𝑦𝑦′𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)𝐿𝐿 . 
The condition for profit maximization with respect to 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) is  𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) + �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) − 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) − 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝑦𝑦′ 1𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)2 𝑊𝑊� 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) 
 6 
 
= 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) + �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) − 1 − 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′ 1𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) 𝑊𝑊� 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) 
= 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧) + �𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) − 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′� 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 0. 
From this  𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦′ − 𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑊𝑊(1 + 𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 1𝜂𝜂 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Therefore, we obtain  𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑊𝑊�1 − 1𝜂𝜂� (1 + 𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿). 
With increasing returns to scale, since 𝜁𝜁 > 0, 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧) is lower than that in a case without increasing 
returns to scale given the value of 𝑊𝑊. 
 
3.  The equilibrium with involuntary unemployment 
 
 Since the model is symmetric, the prices of all goods are equal. Then,  𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧). 
Hence  
                          𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑊𝑊�1−1𝜂𝜂�(1+𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿).                     (9) 
The real wage rate is  𝜔𝜔 = 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃1 = �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� (1 + 𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿). 
If 𝜁𝜁 is constant, this is increasing with respect to 𝐿𝐿. 
 The aggregate supply of the goods is equal to  𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Π = 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿). 
The aggregate demand is  
 𝛼𝛼(𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓Π) + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀. 
Since they are equal,  
 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) + 𝐺𝐺 + 𝑀𝑀, (10) 
or  
 𝑃𝑃1𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) = 𝐺𝐺+𝑀𝑀1−𝛼𝛼 . (11) 
In real terms  
 𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) = 11−𝛼𝛼 (𝑔𝑔 + 𝑚𝑚), (12) 
or 
 
                             𝐿𝐿 = 1
(1−𝛼𝛼)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) (𝑔𝑔 + 𝑚𝑚).                              (13) 
where  
 𝑔𝑔 = 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1 , 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃1. 11−𝛼𝛼 is a multiplier. (12) and (13) mean that the employment 𝐿𝐿 is determined by 𝑔𝑔 + 𝑚𝑚. It can not 
be larger than 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓. However, it may be strictly smaller than 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓 (𝐿𝐿 < 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓). Then, there exists 
involuntary umemployment. Since the real wage rate 𝜔𝜔 = �1 − 1𝜂𝜂� (1 + 𝜁𝜁)𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) is increasing with 
respect to 𝐿𝐿, and the reservation real wage rate 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 is constant, if 𝜔𝜔 > 𝜔𝜔𝑅𝑅 there exists no 
mechanism to reduce the difference between them. 
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4.  Phillips Curve  
  
4. 1  Exogenous changes in labor productivity 
 
 We consider exogenous changes in labor productivity given nominal wage rate. It may be due to a 
change in the unemployment rate in the previous period as assumed by Otaki and Tamai (2011, 
2012). Suppose that the labor productivity 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) in a period, for example, period 𝑡𝑡 increases to 𝜃𝜃𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿) with a constant 𝜃𝜃 > 1 given 𝐿𝐿. From (13) if 𝑔𝑔 and 𝑚𝑚 are constant, employment 𝐿𝐿 
decreases, that is, the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 increases.  (9) means that the price of the 
goods in period 𝑡𝑡 given 𝑊𝑊 falls because η an 𝜁𝜁 are constant. Let 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 be the price of 
the goods (price of the concumption bascket) in period 𝑡𝑡 and that in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1. Then, the 
inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 1, falls given 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1.  
 Alternatively, a decrease in the labor productivity (𝜃𝜃 < 1) increases employment, decreases the 
unemployment rate, and raises the price of the goods and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡𝑡. 
 Therefore, we obtain the negative ralationship between the unemployment rate and the inflation 
rate in the same period. 
 Figure 1 depicts an example the Phillips Curve. 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 denotes the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡.  
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Figure 1: Phillips Curve  
 
 
4.2 Analysis by Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012) 
 
 Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012) suppose that the low (or high) unemployment rate in a period, for 
example, period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 raises (or lowers) the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡 by learning effect. If the 
unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 increases, the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡 falls. Then, from (9) 
the price of the goods rises, and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 falls given the 
(expected) price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Alternatively, a decrease in the unemployment rate in 
period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 rases the labor productivity in period 𝑡𝑡. Then, the price of the goods falls, and the 
infaltion rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 rises given the (expected) price of the goods in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Thus, they have shown the negative relation between the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 −
1 and the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 1. On the other hand, a fall in the price 
in period 𝑡𝑡 means that the inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to period 𝑡𝑡 falls, that is, the low 
unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 explains the low (not high) inflation rate from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to 
period 𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 1. 
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 Their Phillips curve is depicted in Figure 2. 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡−1 denotes the unemployment rate in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Phillips curve by Otaki and Tamai (2011, 2012) 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 We have shown that in an overlapping generations model under monopolistic competiton changes 
in labor prodictivity bring about the negative relation between the unemployment rate and the 
inflation rate in the same period. This conclusion is based on the premise of utility maximization of 
consumers and profit maximization of firms. Therefore, we have presented a microeconomic 
foundation of the Phillips curve. 
 
Appendix: Derivations of (5), (6), (7) and (8) 
 
 From (3) and (4)  𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1 ��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1�10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1 = 𝜆𝜆�10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧, 
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𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2 ��10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1�10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2 = 𝜆𝜆�10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧. 
Since 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) is homogeneous of degree one,  𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) = 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1 + 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2. 
Thus, we obtain  ∫10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧∫10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 𝑋𝑋1𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 𝑋𝑋2, 
and  𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) = 𝜆𝜆 ��10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 + �10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� = 𝜆𝜆(𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π). 
 
From (1) and (2), we have  � 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1�1−𝜂𝜂 ��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂, 
and  � 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2�1−𝜂𝜂 ��10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂 . 
They mean  � 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1�1−𝜂𝜂 ��10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1�10 𝑐𝑐1(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂�10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧, 
and  � 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2�1−𝜂𝜂 ��10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�−1�10 𝑐𝑐2(𝑧𝑧)1−1𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧 = 𝜆𝜆1−𝜂𝜂�10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧. 
Then, we obtain  𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 = 𝜆𝜆 ��10 𝑝𝑝1(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃1, 
and  𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2 = 𝜆𝜆 ��10 𝑝𝑝2(𝑧𝑧)1−𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧� 11−𝜂𝜂 = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃2. 
From them we get  𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2) = 𝜆𝜆(𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2), 
 
 
𝑃𝑃2𝑃𝑃1 = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋1 ,  
and  
 𝑃𝑃1𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑋𝑋2 = 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π. 
Since 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2)  is homogeneous of degree one, 𝜆𝜆  is a function of 𝑃𝑃1  and 𝑃𝑃2 , and 1𝜆𝜆  is 
homogeneous of degree one because proportional increases in 𝑃𝑃1 and 𝑃𝑃2 reduce 𝑋𝑋1 and 𝑋𝑋2 at 
the same rate given 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π. We obtain the following indirect utility function.  
 𝑉𝑉 = 1𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) (𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊 + Π) − 𝛿𝛿𝛽𝛽.  𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2) is a function which is homogenous of degree one. 
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